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4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents tests of the rationality of both inflation and
short-term interest rate forecasts in the bond market. These tests make
use ofsecurity price data to infer information on market expectations. A
closer look at whether market forecasts ofinflation and interest rates are
rational seems necessary in light of recent '''ork (Pesando 1975; Carlson
1977; Mullineaux 1978; Friedman 1980) that evaluates the inflation and
interest rate forecasts from the Livingston and Goldsmith-Nagan sur-
veys. A frequent empirical result in these studies is that the survey
forecasts are inconsistent with the restrictions implied by the theory of
rational expectations. What conclusions about the behavior of market
expectations should we draw from these results?
Oneview which associates surveyforecasts with marketforecasts takes
these empirical results to be evidence that the market is not exploiting all
information in generating its forecasts. The Friedman (1980) study is
particularly disturbing in this regard because it uses data from the Gold-
smith-Nagan interest rate survey which is Inade up of interest rate fore-
casts from actual participants in the market.
An alternative view, Pesando (1975) for example, holds that markets
probably do display rationality of expectations. Irrationality in the
Livingston and Goldsmith-Nagan survey data would then indicate that
these data cannot be used in empirical work to describe market expecta-
tions.
The latter view receives support for tw'O reasons. Survey data are
frequently believed to beinaccurate reflections ofthebehaviorofmarket
participants and are considered unreliable. More important is a point
emphasized in Chapter2 that is oftenignoredin discussing the properties
ofexpectations. Not all marketparticipants need be rationalfor a market
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to display rationalexpectations. Thebehaviorofa marketis not necessar-
ily the same as the behavior ofthe average individual. As long as unex-
ploited profit opportunities are eliminated by some participants in a
market, then the market will behave as though expectations are rational
despite irrationalparticipantsin thatmarket. Therefore, surveyforecasts
donotnecessarilydescribe theforecasts inherentin marketbehavior, and
the irrationality of survey forecasts does not in itself imply that market
forecasts are also irrational.
One purpose of this chapter is to provide indirect evidence on the
usefulness of survey data like Livingston's and Goldsmith-Nagan's for
describing the expectations reflected by markets. Inparticular, this chap-
ter contains direct tests of the rationality of the bond market's interest
rate and inflation forecasts, tests similar to those found in the studies
mentionedin the openingparagraph. Because these tests are designed to
use actual price data to infer information on market expectations rather
than relying on survey data, they can provide direct information on the
rationalityofa particular market. They permit a clearerinterpretationof
results that indicate irrationality in survey forecasts. The empirical work
in this chapterthus will shed light not only on the value of these surveys
for further research, but also on the rationality of expectations in such
markets as those in which bonds are traded.
4.2 Tests of Forecast Rationality
Rationality of expectations requires that
(1)
where X~ is the one-period-ahead forecast ofa variable Xt, generated at
the endofperiod t - 1, and <Pt _ 1 is the setofinformation available at the
end of t - 1. This implies that the forecast error, X t - X~, should be
uncorrelatedwith any information orlinear combinations ofinformation
in <Pt-1.
This implication is the basis of the tests of rationality found in the
studies of survey forecasts mentioned above. Consider the following





X t == bo + ~ biXt - i+ U1t'
i=l
k
X~ == Co + ~ CiXt - i+ U2t·
i=l
Theseequationscanbeestimatedwith ordinaryleastsquares (OLS), and
under the hypothesis of rational expectations Modigliani and Shiller61 Are Market Forecasts Rational?
(1973) point out that the estimated bi coefficients should not differ
significantly from the estimated Ci coefficients. This null hypothesis that
(4) bi=ciforalli=O, ... ,k
is subjectedtoa conventionalFtestin thesurveyforecast studies. A more
detailed discussion of the rationale behind this test can be found in
Chapter 3.
The theory ofefficient markets leads to restrictions similar to those in
(4) which can also be easily tested. Market efficiency (or, equivalently,
rational expectations) implies that securities prices in a capital market
should reflect all available information, and hence an expectation as-
sessed by themarketshouldequalthe trueexpectationconditionedonall
available information, E (... l<Pt-l). To give this conceptempirical con-
tent, we must specify the relationship bet,veen the probability distribu-
tion of future prices and current prices. "fhis requires a model which
describes how current equilibrium prices are determined. Here, the
market is assumed to equate expected, one-period, holding returns
across securities, allowins for risk (liquidity) premiums which are con-
stant over time.
In the case of long-term bonds, for example, the one-period return
denoted by Yt, is the nominal return from holding the long-term bond
from t - 1 to t, including both capital gains plus interest payments. The
model of market equilibrium implies that the equilibrium returnYt is
(5)
where
't-1 = the return on a one-period bond from t - 1 to t
(which of course equals the expected one-period
return)-this is just the: short-term interest rate,
d = the constant liquidity (risk) premium,
E rn( • .• l<Pt-1) = expectation assessed by the market at t - 1.
As discussed in Chapter 2 market efficiency implies that
(6)
If we call the equilibrium return of Yt a "normal" return, then the
equation above statesthat no unexploitedprofit opportunitiesexistin the
bond market: at today's price, market participants cannot expect to earn
a higher-than-normal return by investing in a long-term bond. The
efficient markets equation (6) is analogous to an arbitrage condition.
Arbitrageurs who are willing to speculate may perceive unexploited
profit opportunities and purchase orsell bonds until the price is driven to
thepointwhere (6) holds. Thusmarketefficiency doesnotrequirethatall
participants in the market are rational and use information efficiently.62 Empirical Studies
Theaverage behaviorofanindividualin themarketis nota reliable guide
to the market's behavior.
Equation (6) above implies thatYt - 't-1 should be uncorrelated with
anypastavailable informationorlinearcombinationsofthis information.
A model consistent with (6)-referred to as the efficient-markets
model-is
(7) Yt = 't-1 + d + (Xt - Xr)~ + Et,
where an e superscript denotes expected values conditional on all past
available information (i.e., Xr = E(Xtl<f>t-1), a one-period-ahead ra-
tional forecast), and
X t = a variable (or vector ofvariables) relevant to the pricing of long
bonds,
~ = a coefficient (or vector of coefficients),
Et = an error process where E (Etl<f>t-1) = 0 and hence Et is serially
uncorrelated.
Theefficient-marketsmodel stressesthatonlywhen new information hits
the market will Yt differ from 't-1 + d. As equation (7) makes clear, this
is equivalent to the proposition that only unanticipated changes (sur-
prises) in variables can be correlated with Yt - 't-1.
The assumption that the coefficient on't-1 equals one in equation (7)
has been subjected to empirical test by Fama and Schwert (1977) and
Mishkin (1978) and is not rejected. It has been tested also for the
1954-1976sample period ofthis chapter. A quarterly bondreturns series
was regressed on the beginning of period, ninety-day Treasury Bill rate
(also at quarterly rates) using weighted least squares to correct for
heteroscedasticity. (Mishkin 1978 describes this procedure.) The coef-
ficient on the bill rate was not significantly different from one at the 5
percent level (t = .51). In a recent paper, Shiller (1979) has found
evidence suggesting that the liquidity premium is correlated with the
spreadbetweenlong rates and short rates. Totestthis propositionfor the
1954-1976 sample period, Yt - 't-1 was regressed on this spread, again
using weighted least squares to correct for heteroscedasticity. The evi-
dence supporting Shiller's proposition is even weaker in this sample
period than in the regression results reported in Mishkin (1978): the
coefficient on the spread variable did not differ significantly from zero
even at the 10 percent significance level (t = 1.01). In addition, as is
discussed in Chapter 2, as long as the equilibrium return Yt has small
variation relative to other sources of variation in the actual returns,
assumptionsdescribingtheequilibriumreturnarenotcriticaltoempirical
tests of the efficient-markets model. This appears to be the case for the
long-term bonds discussed here. Forexample, using the model ofmarket
equilibrium described above, over the 1954-1976 period the variation in63 Are Market Forecasts Rational?
Yt is less than2percentofthevariationin the actual returnstemmingfrom
other sources.
Itis easytoshow thatthis efficient-markets modelis consistentwith the
expectations hypothesis ofthe term structurewhere predictions offuture
short-term interest rates are optimal forecasts. To be more concrete, if
the long-term bond is an n-periodsecurityvvhere the liquiditypremiumis




RLt = the interest rate (yield to maturity) on the long bond,
Et = Em(· . . 1<Pt-l),
n = number of periods until maturity.
When expectations of future short rates are rational, then with some
algebraic manipulation the expectations hypothesis described by this
equation yields the same implications as equation (7). Note also that the
efficient-markets model does not imply causation from X t - X~ to
Yt - 't-l· It is equally plausible that causation runs in the otherdirection
or that a third factor affects both of these variables simultaneously.
Given a forecasting equation for X t of the form of equation (2),
rationality of expectations implies that
(9)
k
X~ = Co + ~ CiXt-i,
i=1
where Ci = bi for all i because X~ must equal the conditional expectation
of equation (2). Substituting (9) into (7) vve have an efficient-markets
model of the following form:
(10) Yt = rt-l + d + 13[Xt- (Co + ;#1 C;Xt-;)] + Et·
Equations (10) and (2) can then be stacked into one regression system
and estimated by nonlinear least-squares as described in Chapter 2,
imposingtherestrictionsin (4) implied byforecast rationality: that bi = Ci
for all i. Intheinitial estimatesofeach equation, Goldfeld-Quandt (1965)
tests usually indicate the presence of heteroscedasticity, which is cor-
rected for by weighting observations, using a time-trend procedure out-
lined in Glesjer (1969). The rationality restrictions can now be tested in
the efficient-markets framework with the likelihood ratio test described
in Chapter 2.
Chapter3 demonstrates that the tests ofthe rationality restrictions are
equivalent to more common regression tests of the efficient-markets64 Empirical Studies
condition in equation (6). However, as we shall see, exploring the
efficiency orrationality ofthe bond market by analyzing the relation ofbi
in equation (2) to the Ciin (10) yields insights thatthe more common tests
do not provide.
4.3 Empirical Results
The first set of tests conducted here will scrutinize Friedman's (1980)
finding thatthesurveymeasuresofinterestrate forecasts are inconsistent
with rationality. Friedman's results were obtained using thirty quarterly
observations extending from September 1969 to December 1976. This
sample period is used to estimate the equations (10) and (2) system using
bond return and Treasury Bill rate data to be described. Friedman's
choice of six lagged quarters in the autoregressive specification will be
adapted also. An additional test conducted over the longer 1954-1976
sample period will provide more information about the rationality ofthe
bond market's forecasts.
Tests ofthe rationality ofthe CPI inflation forecasts will be conducted
in a similar mannerusing the nonlinear efficient-markets procedure. The
1959-1969 sample period used by Pesando, Carlson, and Mullineaux,
where so many rejections of rationality have been found, will be used
here, in addition to the longer 1954-1976 sample period.
4.3.1 The Data
The sources and definitions of data used in the empirical work are as
follows:
Yt = quarterly returnfrom holding a long-term U.S. governmentbond
from the beginning to the end of the quarter. The data were
obtainedfrom the Centerfor Research in SecurityPrices (CRSP)
at the University of Chicago, and are described in Fisher and
Lorie (1977) and Mishkin (1978). Note that this return series is
calculatedfrom end-of-period price data to avoid the aggregation
problem discussed later in this chapter.
rt = the end of quarter ninety-day Treasury Bill rate at a quarterly
rate. Bill rate datawere obtainedfrom the BoardofGovernorsof
the Federal Reserve Board.
1ft = the CPI inflation rate (quarterly rate) calculatedfrom the change
in the log ofthe CPI (seasonally adjusted) from the last month of
the previous quarterto the last month ofthe current quarter. The
CPI was collected from the U.S. Department of Commerce's
Business Statistics and Survey ofCurrent Business.
4.3.2 Results on the Rationality of Interest Rate Forecasts
Table 4.1 provides the tests for the rationality offorecasts in the bond
market both in Friedman's 1969-1976 sample period and in the longer65 Are Market Forecasts Rational?










Note: Likelihood ratio statistic is distributed asymptotically as X
2(6). Marginal significance
level is the probability ofgetting that value of the likelihood ratio statistic or higher under
the null hypothesis.
1954-1976sample period, andtable 4.2 provides the parameterestimates
ofthe constrained efficient-markets model for both sample periods. The
marginal significance levels in table 4.1 are the probability of obtaining
that value of X
2 or higher under the null hypothesis that the rationality
constraints are valid. A marginal significance level less than .05 indicates
a rejection ofthe null hypothesis at the 5 percent level and, therefore, a
rejection of forecast rationality in the bond market.
As the likelihood ratio statistics in table 4.1 indicate, very little evi-
dence in the bond market data supports irrationality of interest rate
forecasts. Not only are there no significant rejections of the rationality
restrictions in either Friedman's sample period or the longer 1954-1976
sample period, but the marginal significance levels oftable 4.1 are quite
high. In addition, the efficient-markets model from which these likeli-
hood ratio statistics have been derived, whose parameter estimates are
found in table 4.2, has several attractive properties. The coefficients on
the unanticipated movements of the bill rate are significantly different
from zero at the 1percentlevel, indicating thatmovements in short-term
interest rates are information relevant to the pricing oflong-term bonds.
As might be expected from the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure, thesignofthis coefficient is negativce, indicatingthatanunanti-
cipated rise in the bill rate is accompanied by higher long-term rates with
a resulting lower bond return. Furthermore, the magnitude ofthis coef-
ficient is extremely close to that found in another study (Mishkin 1978),
where a different measure of short-rate expectations is used.
1
Thefailure to rejecttherationalityofinterestrateforecasts in the bond
market provides some resolution of how to interpret Friedman's result
that the Goldsmith-Nagan survey measures ofinterest rate forecasts are
irrational. This finding suggests that the surve~ymeasures ofinterest rate
forecasts are not an accurate description of the actual bond market
1. Note that Mishkin (1978) used Treasury Bill data \vhich are at an annual rate rather
than a quarterly rate. The coefficient on the unanticipated bill rate, in that case, must be
multiplied by four when compared to the (3 coefficients in table 4.2.66 Empirical Studies
Table 4.2 Nonlinear Estimates of the Efficient-Markets Model:
6
Yt = rt-l + d + ~(rt - bo- I bi rt-i) + Et
6 i=1
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Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
forecasts. The value ofthese survey measures to otherempirical work is
thus suspect. The view that the bond market could have improved its
forecasting behavior by exploiting the information in the past bill rate
movements more efficiently is not supported. Of course, these results
should not be surprising considering how large a body ofevidence (e.g. ,
see Fama 1970) supports efficiency in the bond market.
4.3.3 Results on the Rationality of Inflation Forecasts
The test ofthe rationality ofinflation forecasts in the bond market can
be found in table 4.3. The parameter estimates of the constrained
efficient-markets model are in table 4.4. The efficient-markets model
yields the expected result that an unanticipated rise in inflation is associ-
ated with higher long-term rates and lower bond returns, although the
coefficients on unanticipated inflation are not as significant as the coef-
ficients on unanticipated interest rate movements. However, the likeli-
hood ratio test rejects the rationality restrictions for the 1959-1969 sam-
ple period at the 1 percent significance level-this is the sample period
where otherstudies (Pesando 1975; Carlson 1977; Mullineaux 1978) also
find the Livingston price expectations data to be irrational.67 Are Market Forecasts Rational?










Note: See table 4.1.
A look at the unconstrained estimates ofthe autoregressive model of
inflation and the efficient-markets model provides a clue to why this
rejection ofrationality occurs. The sum ofthe coefficients on the lagged
inflation rates in the unconstrained autoregressive model of inflation is
positive and greater than one, indicating that a rise in inflation would
persist: theb i startingwith lag one are - .06, .59, .19, - .03, .30, and .25.
On the other hand, the sum of these autoregressive parameters derived
from the unconstrained efficient-markets model is negative, indicating
that the bond market expected that a rise in inflation would be reversed:
Table 4.4 Nonlinear Estimates of the Efficient-Markets Model:
6
Yt = 't-l + d + J3('ITt - bo - I bi ~Tt-;) + Et
6 i=1






















Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.68 Empirical Studies
the Ci startingwith lag one are - .27, .25, 1.04, - .30, - .94, and - 1.60.
This discrepancy is what leads to the rejection of the rationality of the
bond market's forecasts ofinflation, and it should not be all that surpris-
ing considering the sample period. Theperiodstartedwith a low inflation
rate that then rose to unusually high levels by the end ofthe period. The
fact that this was an unusual period might well cause the rationality
restrictions found in table 4.3 to be rejected, even though the bond
market would normally have rational inflation forecasts. A similar prob-
lem has been found for the rationality ofinflation forecasts (represented
by forecasts of exchange rate changes) in the German hyperinflation
(Frenkel 1977), another unusual inflationary episode. The likelihood
ratio test of the rationality of the inflation forecasts in the longer 1954-
1976 period provides some evidence for this conjecture. In this period
there is no rejection ofthe rationality restrictions at the 5 percent signifi-
cance level. The bond market thus appears to have had rational inflation
forecasts when a longer time horizon is taken into account.
Because these rationality restrictions are generated under the main-
tained hypothesis that Yt - 't-1 is uncorrelated with anticipated move-
ments by X, the rejection may arise from the invalidity ofthe maintained
hypothesis and not from the irrationality of inflation expectations. To
explore this possibility, the hypothesis of the rationality of the X~ fore-
casts can be tested along the lines discussed in Chapter 2 without main-
taining the hypothesis that Yt - 't-1 is uncorrelated with X~. This in-
volves estimating the system
(11)
k
X t = bo + ~ biXt - i + U1t,
i=l
Yt = rt-1 + d + 13[Xt - (Co +J1C;Xt-;)]
+ S(Co+ ;#1 C;Xt-;) +E t ,
and testing the null hypothesis that bi = Ci for all i. Note that this
procedure tests k - 1 restrictions, one less than in the previous tests.
When this test for the rationality of the inflation forecasts is conducted
with the same 1959-1969 sample period, the data still strongly reject the
rationalityrestrictions. Theresultinglikelihood ratio statistic [distributed
asymptotically as X
2 (5)] equaled 16.65 with a marginal significance level
of.005. Thisrejection atthe 1percentlevel adds additionalsupporttothe
view that inflation forecasts were not rational for this sample period.
The efficient-markets model does not specify whether seasonally ad-
justedorunadjusteddatashouldbe usedin thesetests. Thetests reported
in the tables use seasonally adjusted data because they are more compa-69 Are Market Forecasts Rational?
rable with the rationality tests ofthe Livingston data found in the litera-
ture. However, seasonal adjustment of the CPI with the X-II program
tends to "smudge" the data, and thus the, tests here have also been
conducted with seasonally unadjusted data. The results are similar to
those reported in tables 4.3 and 4.4. The likelihood ratio statistic for the
1959:1-1969:4 sample period was 23.25 (marginal significance level of
.001), and for the 1954:1-1976:4 sample pe~riod it was 12.32 (marginal
significance level of .055).
What do these results tell us about the accuracy ofthe Livingston price
expectations data? We must take some care in ourinterpretationofthese
results. The Livingston survey does not sam.ple participants in the bond
marketspecifically, butthefollowing conclusionneverthelessseemsto be
indicated: Because inflation forecasts in the~ bond market from 1959 to
1969 do notsatisfyrestrictionsimplied byrati.onality, thefailure ofsurvey
measures to satisfy these restrictions cannot be taken as evidence that
they are inaccurate measures of rnarket expectations. Clearly, further
research into the rationality of the Livingston price expectations data
over longer sample periods is needed before we can pronounce on their
accuracy.
4.3.4 Joint Tests of the Rationality of Both
Inflation and Interest Rate Forecasts
A further application of these tests relates to the work of Modigliani
and Shiller (1973). Modigliani andShiller's seminalpaperpostulates that
information on both short-term interest rates and inflation would in-
fluence the price oflong-term bonds, along \vith the proposition that the
autoregressivelagstructureontheone-period-aheadshort-rateandinfla-
tion forecasts would be "rational" in the sense discussed here. They
present evidence supporting this position, yet the evidence is incomplete
in two ways. First, they do not actually apply formal statisticaltests to the
proposition of rationality in the autoregressive lag structure. Second,
their use of averaged data in the empirical work leads to a potentially
severe aggregation problem.
A simple example from Mishkin (1978) illustrates Modigliani and
Shiller's argument and why it breaks down \vith averaged data. Assume
thatthe stochasticprocessgeneratingtheshort-terminterestraterthas an
ARIMA (0,1,1) characterization as follows:
(12) (1 - L)rt = (1 - AL)ut
or, equivalently,
(13)
I-A 00 • =--- r t-1 + Ut = (1 - A) I Alrt_i+ Ut ,
1 - AL i= 170 Empirical Studies
where
L = the lag operator,
Ut = error term with the property that E(Utl<Pt-l) = O.
Assumingexpectations are rational, themarket'sforecast ofrt + 1 attime t
is:
(14)




Rewriting equation (8), which characterizes the expectations hypothesis
of the term structure, the long bond rate at time t, RLt, is
(17)
(18)
Substituting (14)-(16) into (17) we have
r t (n - 1)(1- 'A ) r t RLt=-+ -- --- rt+d=-
n n 1 - 'AL n
(n-l) 00 •
+ -n- (1-'A)i;o}(rt- i+d.
Modigliani and Shiller postulate that if the bond market is rational then
thelag structurein (13) must beconsistentwith (18): thatis, the 'A mustbe
the same in the two equations.
Note that the rt andRLt are end-of-periodvariables so this proposition
is necessarily valid only for end-of-period data. Indeed, it does not hold
for averaged data. To see this, take the case where the short rate is a
random walk: that is, 'A = 0 in (12). Working (1960) has shown that a
variable that is a random walk will, if it is averaged, have an ARIMA
(0,1,1) time-series process with the correlation coefficient at lag one
equalto .25. Theappearanceofthemoving average termwhenthedatais
averaged is really quite intuitive. If a variable is a random walk, then a
rise in its averagevalue from thefirst periodto thesecond is morelikelyif
its value at the end ofthe second period is higher than its average for the
second period. Then the average for the third and following periods is
likely to be higher than the average in the second period. This is exactly
what we would find for an ARIMA (0,1,1) time-series process.71 Are Market Forecasts Rational?
With the random walk characterization of the short rate,
(19) Et't+j = 't for j"?l.
It is easyto see that the expectations hypothesis implies thatthe long rate
will be a random walk as well. Using Working's result, averages of both




(1 - L),: = (1 + .268L)Ut~
(1 - L)RLf = (1 + .268L)ut,
where
'ta = the average value of , over the period t - 1 to t ,
RL~ = the average value of RL over the period t - 1 to t.
Using the expectations hypothesis equation (17) where , and RL are
replaced by ,a and RLa , equation (20) implies that the averaged value of
the long rate has the following time-series process
(22) (1 - L)RL~ = (1 + .2~8 L)Ut .
This time-series process is different from (21) and is obviously incorrect.
Indeed, for large n it will be very close to a random walk.
The above example thus indicates that, if the data are averaged,
equation (17) cannot be used to derive the lag weights ofshort rates in a
long equation. Modigliani and Shiller's evidence onthe rationality ofthe
term structure proceeds with exactly this derivation with averaged data,
and then comparing these lag weights with those actually estimated from
a long rate equation. Yet as the example shows, this procedure is not
valid.
The efficient-markets model discussed in this paper leads to a formal
statistical test of the Modigliani-Shiller results using end-of-period data.
Including both short-term interest rate and inflation movements as rele-
vant information to the pricing of long-term bonds as is done by Mo-
digliani and Shiller, we can write the efficient-markets model as
(23)
where 11't = CPI inflation rate.
The autoregressive models for rand 11' are
(24)
k k
'i = kr + ~ di'i-i + ~ ei 7rt-i + Ul t ,
i= 1 i= 1
k k
11't = kTI + ~ hrt-i + ~ g(Trt-i + U2t,
i= 1 i=l
and using these autoregressive models to derive expectations,72 Empirical Studies
(25) Yt=1(-l +d+~r[rt-(kr+.! di7Tt-i+.I ei7Tt-i)]
1=1 1= 1
+ ~'lT [1Tt- (k-rr +.! tTt-i +.! gi 7Tt-i)] + Et·
1= 1 1= 1
Theequationsof(24) and (25) can thenbeestimatedjointlyas beforeand
tests of the rationality restrictions can be conducted with the likelihood
ratio test. These tests then provide direct information on the Modigliani
and Shiller rationality proposition.
These tests and estimates ofthe efficient-markets -model can be found
in tables 4.5 and 4.6. The term-structure equation in the MPS (MIT-
Penn-SSRC) Quarterly Econometric Model and the Modigliani and
Shiller paper both use a sample period extending from 1954:4 to 1966:4
and an eighteen-quarter lag on short rates and inflation estimated with a
third-order Almon lag. Therefore both the 1954:4-1966:4 and the
1954:1-1976:4sample period, as well as the Modigliani-Shillerprocedure
for estimatingthelag structure, are usedin the rationalitytests conducted
here.
The likelihood ratio tests in table 4.5 confirm Modigliani and Shiller's
results. The restrictions implied by rationality in both the inflation and
interest rate forecasts are not rejected at the 5 percent significance level
andagainthemarginalsignificancelevels arehigh. Seasonally unadjusted
CPI inflation data rather than the seasonally adjusted data again leads to
results like those reported in tables 4.5 and 4.6. The likelihood ratio
statistic with the unadjusted data for the 1954:4-1966:4 period is 17.00
(marginal significance of .074) and for 1954:1-1976:4it is 11.89 (marginal
significance level of .292). Thus Modigliani and Shiller's contention that
the term structure of interest rates displays rationality is supported in
these tests, a finding we should have expected considering the results of
the previous tests in this chapter and in Sargent (1979).
4.4 Conclusion
This chapterprovides an answer to the question, Are marketforecasts
rational? Empirical tests conducted here, with one exception, indicate














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.75 Are Market Forecasts Rational?
thatfor the bondmarketthe answer is yes. Bondmarketdataprovides no
evidence that interest rate forecasts are irrational. Thus evidence of
irrationality in the Goldsmith-Nagan survey ofinterest rate expectations
can beinterpretedas castingdoubtonthe accuracyofthis surveymeasure
for describing market expectations. The accuracy ofthe Livingston price
expectations data, however, is still an open question since irrationality
has been found in both the bond market and survey data for the 1959-
1969 period. This issue cannot be resolved without further empirical
research onthe rationalityofthis surveydataoverlonger sample periods.